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TO BE OR NOT TO BE: REFLECTIONS ON CHANGING
OUR TORT SYSTEM
JERRY J. PHILLIPS*

I.

THE PLIGHT OF THE LIABILITY INSURANCE INDUSTRY

Professor Galanter's analysis of litigation statistics provided by
the National Center For State Courts and by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts presents a potent antidote to the
persistent charges of a runaway tort system characterized by excessive amounts of litigation and verdicts. His conclusions are supported by a critical article in the August 1986 issue of Consumer
Reports,' and by a review of the causes of the current liability insurance crisis in a report of an ad hoc committee on insurance prepared by the National Association of Attorneys General. 2 The latter
report contends that the property/casualty insurance assertions of
economic woe are distorted by inappropriate accounting methods
that do not establish realistic reserves and that fail to reflect real
income in terms of premium investments and capital gains.' The
report concludes that the property/casualty insurance industry has
shown a healthy real profit over the past decade, and that there has
been a substantial upturn in insurance earnings in 1985-1986 since
the low year of 1984. 4
Professor Galanter notes that the province of Ontario, Canada
is experiencing a liability insurance availability and affordability crisis even though that jurisdiction already has in place many of the
tort changes currently advocated by the insurance industry.5 This
observation parallels that of the Attorneys General report to the effect that prior restrictive tort changes in Pennsylvania and in various
state medical malpractice laws have had no appreciable effect in low* W. P. Toms Professor of Law, University of Tennessee. B.A., Yale University,
1956; M.A., Cambridge University, 1958; J.D., Yale Law School, 1961. Author of
casebooks on torts and products liability, a products liability Nutshell, and a treatise on
products liability.
1. The Manufactured Crisis, CONSUMER REPORTS 544 (Aug. 1986).
2. F. BELLOTrI, J. VAN DE KAMP, L. THORNBURG, J. MATrox, C. BROWN, B. LAFOLLETrE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES OF THE CURRENT CRISIS OF UNAVAILABILITY AND
UNAFFORDABILITY OF LIABILITY INSURANCE (1986) [hereinafter BELLOTrI].

3. Id. at 10-16.
4. Id. at 37 n.10.
5. Galanter, The Day After The Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 37 (1986).
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ering insurance liability premiums in those jurisdictions. 6 There are
other data indicating that liability insurance rates in many sectors of
the economy have drastically increased without any evidence of excessive or even notable claims increases; 7 and the General Accounting Office has estimated that the rate of liability insurance premium
increases in the last few years has more than doubled the rate necessary to compensate for increased claims losses in those years.'
These conclusions suggest a cautious attitude toward the tort
changes currently being proposed to cure an insurance problem
that either may not exist-or, if it does exist, may be only tangentially related to the tort system. Moreover, even if it could be
demonstrated that recent liability insurance premium increases,
market withdrawals, and restrictions of coverage were substantially
caused by the tort system, it must still be asked whether the proposed tort changes are justified on their own merits. Even if there is
a tort litigation and verdict explosion, that explosion may be fully
justified given current conditions,' and tort claims verdicts may be
substantially valid. 10 The appropriate inquiry, therefore, is to examine the proposed changes on their own merits, apart from any
relation between the tort system and the insurance industry.
II.

COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE TORT SYSTEM

The most common current litany of complaints against the tort
system centers on six principal areas: (1) the restriction or elimination of punitive damages; (2) the elimination of the collateral source
rule; (3) the adoption of a general tort statute of repose; (4) the
elimination or restriction of contingent fees; (5) the restriction on
recovery for pain and suffering; and (6) the elimination or restriction ofjoint and several liability. Some reflections on these proposals are therefore in order.
6. BELLOTrI, supra note 2, at 43-44.

7. See, e.g., Testimony of Val Cox, President of Ocoee River Outfitters Ass 'n; Brian Rosecrance,
Executive Director of Appalachia Serv. Project; and Tim Wibking, Staff Attorney for the Tennessee
School Boards Ass'n, Before the Tennessee Governor's Task Force on Tort Reform, (Memphis,
Tenn., July-Aug. 1986).
8. BELLOTrI, supra note 2, at 40. The GAO estimated that an approximate 30%
increase in general liability premiums in 1984 would have enabled the insurers to compensate for increased losses. In 1985, however, the industry recorded an increase in
general liability premiums of 81%. Since 1984 was the industry's worst year, it was
assumed that the 30% figure, or even less, would have applied in 1985 also. Id.
9. See Galanter, supra note 5, at 27-28.
10. BELLOT17r, supra note 2, at 28-29 (noting that increases in verdict amounts may be
due to increased medical expenses and rising wages).
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A. Punitive Damages. One of the things that strikes fear in the
hearts of liability insurers is the possibility of large punitive damage
awards, particularly in the mass-litigation context such as asbestos
and Dalkon Shield claims. The complaint is that these damages are
uncontrolled, and that they provide a windfall to the plaintiff.
Over against these arguments is the proposition that willful,
wanton misconduct does occur, and when it does it should be punished. The criminal justice system, for whatever reason, does not
seem capable of providing the needed deterrence in this context.
The windfall argument is also countered by the proposition that the
possibility of recovering punitive damages may provide a necessary
incentive for an attorney to bring a meritorious and socially desirable claim that would otherwise be financially unattractive to the attorney.1 ' In any case, it does not appear that many punitive damage
claims are successful,

2

and the courts carefully scrutinize and often

eliminate or reduce such awards.
In order to make certain that punitive damages are imposed
only when they are clearly and equitably called for, a few corrective
measures might be taken short of eliminating punitive damages altogether. First, the burden of proof, which in most jurisdictions is a
mere preponderance of the evidence, might be raised to a clear and
convincing standard before awarding punitive damages.'" Second,
vicarious liability for punitive damages could be eliminated. 4 On
this point it is interesting to note the anomaly that punitive damages
are typically insurable when they are imposed vicariously, as for example against a corporation for the acts of its employees. Heretofore, however, insurers have resisted any effort to exclude such
insurance coverage on the ground that this exclusion would create a
conflict for the insurance company, whose interests would then be
served by proof of recklessness if such proof relieved the company
of liability. 5 This conflict would presumably be eliminated if insur11. See W. PROSSER, J. WADE, V. SCHWARTZ, CASES & MATERIALS ON TORTS 561 (7th
ed. 1982).
12. Daniels, Punitive Damages: The Real Story, 72 A.B.A. J. 60 (Aug. 1986).
13. "A few jurisdictions require clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, at least in
some actions before awarding punitive damages. Most require a mere preponderance of
the evidence." K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 7.2(A)(3) (1980).
14. "A number of courts, perhaps, as usually asserted, the majority of those that
have passed on the issue, hold the employer, especially the corporate employer, liable
for punitive damages for malicious acts of the employee." D. DOBBS, REMEDIES 214
(1973).
15. See Keeton, Statutes, Gaps, and Values in Tort Law, 44J. AIR L. & COM. 1, 14 n.12
(1978).
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ance liability were nevertheless imposed for compensatory damages
though recklessness is shown.
B. The CollateralSource Rule. A longtime favorite whipping boy
of tort law critics has been the collateral source rule, which allegedly
allows economically wasteful double recovery for the same injury.
The criticism of this rule disregards the compelling consideration
that collateral sources are derived from the generosity or thrift of
the plaintiff or third person who never intends to confer a benefit on
the tortfeasor through such sources. Curiously, no one suggests
that the collateral source rule should be eliminated with reference to
life insurance proceeds, although clearly such proceeds are a collateral source in a wrongful death case. Moreover, if the rule were
eliminated, any economic efficiency thereby obtained could well be
obviated by widespread adoption of subrogation on behalf of the
collateral source provider. 16
C. Statutes of Repose. A sustained effort to pass statutes of repose has been a phenomenon of legislative lobbying for tort law
change during the past several decades. A cut-off of claims, without
regard to their accrual date, was first adopted in the construction
industry,' 7 then in medical malpractice,' 8 and more recently in
products liability.' 9
A number of courts have held such statutes to be unconstitutional.20 Whatever the outcome on that issue, such statutes are
harsh and their time period bears no reasonable relationship to the
validity or invalidity of the underlying claim. Moreover, they are
subject to a number of exceptions, either by statute or at common
16. Property insurance claims are generally subrogated to the insurer; the practice of
subrogation varies with medical, surgical, and hospitalization insurance. R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAw 147, 149 (1971). Many states allow the employer to be subrogated, to
recover workers' compensation payments, in an action by an employer against a thirdparty tortfeasor. 2A A. LARSON, THE LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 74.00-74.50
(1983). The majority view holds that the employer's contributory negligence, if any, is
no defense to this third-party action. Weisgall, ProductLiability in the Workplace: The Effect
of Workers' Compensation on the Rights and Liabilitiesof Third Parties, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 1035,
1046.
17. Dworkin, Product Liability of the 1980s: "Repose Is Not the Destiny" of Manufacturers,
61 N.C.L. REV. 33, 43-44 (1982).
18. Id.
19. See Phillips, An Analysis of Proposed Reform of Products Liability Statutes of Limitations,
56 N.C.L. REV. 663, 664 (1978).
20. See, e.g., Hanson v. Williams County, N.D., Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH)
11,000
(D.N.D. 1986), and cases cited therein.
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law, thereby making the rule seem arbitrary in application. 2 1
The reason insurers want a repose statute is to eliminate the
possibility of claims arising on a policy long after the policy has expired. The possibility of such "long tail" claims makes rate-setting
very difficult, the insurers contend. However, insurers are seeking a
change from an "occurrence" to a "claims-made" basis of coverage, 2 2 and this change if adopted should substantially solve the
long-tail problem, at least for insurers. Under a claims-made policy,
regardless of when a claim arises against the insured, the insurer will
be liable only for claims asserted during the policy year.
Much can be said for a uniform statute of limitations for all tort
claims irrespective of the theory asserted or the type of damage
claimed. Such a uniform period would eliminate the anomaly of one
statute undermining the protection of another, and the apparently
arbitrary differences of time among different statutes of limitation.
A uniform statute of this sort, however, should have a rule of reasonable claim discovery as the basis for accrual of the claim and
commencement of the period of limitation, in order to avoid the
harshness of a repose type of statute.
D. The Contingent Fee. There is a widespread belief among insurers that the contingent fee system encourages litigation. In fact,
the system probably has just the opposite effect, since a prudent attorney will not risk the time and expense of litigation on a contingent basis for a claim that is of doubtful merit. Whatever
considerations may encourage frivolous claims or defenses, they
seem not to include the contingent fee system. Moreover, the contingent fee arrangement provides access to the judicial system by
the ordinary person in a way that fosters democratic values.
The concern that contingent fees are often or sometimes excessive presents an entirely different issue. However, all fees are subject to judicial review under a court's inherent supervisory
jurisdiction. In addition, attorneys are subject to discipline for
21. See Phillips, supra note 19, at 666-72.
22. The Insurance Service Office has proposed a new claims-made policy form, and
insurers are pushing for its adoption. Hilder, Changes in Liability Insurance Spur Confusion
Among Business Clients, Wall. St.J., Nov. 20, 1985, § 2, at 33, col. 4; Policy Language Developments, 8 Ins. Litig. Rep. (Miller-Freeman) 944-45 (Mar. 1986). It is not clear, however,
that this new form will be widely adopted, or that it is at all desirable for the insureds.
See Anderson, Newman, & Russel, ProposedNew Claims-MadeLiability Insurance Policy: Panacea or Golden Road to Disaster, in INSURANCE, EXCESS & REINSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES

1986, at 393, 434-35 (1985); Opinion and Decision of New York State Insurance Department on
Issues Raised by Insurance Services Office on Commercial General Liability Claims-Made Form, 1986
J. INs. REG. 39.
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changing excessive fees.2" Thus, the remedies for excessive fees are
already in place.
E. Pain and Suffering. There have been widespread efforts to
limit-or place a cap on-the amount of recoverable damages for
pain and suffering in tort litigation, and these efforts have met with
some notable successes to date.2 4 The basis for the attack on recovery for pain and suffering is much like that for punitive damagesnamely, that these damages are not readily measurable and are subject to arbitrary fluctuation in amount.
Unlike the situation for punitive damages, however, there appears to be no widespread current move to abolish pain and suffering damages entirely. Rather, the effort is simply to place a fixed
dollar limit on the amount of such damages recoverable in a single
tort action. A fixed damage figure, however, is as arbitrary as the
uncertainty in amount of recovery it seeks to cure. Also, a statutory
limitation of this sort freezes the law in an area that should remain
flexible to meet changing times and circumstances. The inability to
25
keep statutes abreast of changing times is notorious.
Uncertainty cannot be eliminated from many of the important
areas of the law, nor should it be. The reasonable person and proximate cause standards should not be poured in concrete. Neither
should damages for pain and suffering. It cannot be doubted that
damages for pain and suffering are among the very real damages
suffered by a tort victim.
To argue that many people suffer pain without remedy is beside
the point. Many people suffer lost employment without remedy
also. It may be that tort compensation arbitrarily distinguishes between victims of actionable and of nonactionable misfortunes, if
compensation were the only goal of tort law. But the distinction is
justified when the equally important goal of tort deterrence is taken
into account.

23. See, e.g., Florida Bar Ass'n v. Moriber, 314 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1975).
24. Recently, the following states placed caps in varying amounts on the amount of
recoverable noneconomic damages: (1) Alaska: Act of June 10, 1986, ch. 139, 1986
Alaska Sess. Laws (to be codified as ALAsKA STAT. § 09.17.010); (2) Connecticut: CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (West Supp. 1986); (3) Florida: Act ofJune 26, 1986, ch. 86180, 1986 Fla. Sess. Law Serv., No. 5, p. 660 (to be codified as FLA. STAT. § 768.80);
(4) Maryland: Act of May 27, 1986, ch. 639, 1986 Md. Laws 2347 (to be codified as MD.
CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-108); (5) New Hampshire: Act of June 6, 1986, ch.
227:13, 1986 N.H. Laws (to be codified as N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:4-d).
25. See G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATuTEs ch. 1 (1982).
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F. Joint and Several Liability. Another major area of attack, with
some signal success,2 6 has been against the doctrine of joint and
several liability. If fault is the basis of tort liability, say the critics,
then why hold a tortfeasor liable for more than his or her own degree of fault?
One aspect of this attack implicates the doctrine of comparative
fault, which has been adopted in some form in an overwhelming
number of American jurisdictions.2 7 Under this doctrine, the
amount of the plaintiff's recovery is reduced by the percentage of
his or her own fault, which may include contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and misuse of a product or instrumentality.
The real sticking point, however, relates to the question of who
should bear the percentage of responsibility of an entity against
whom judgment is uncollectible. Should the plaintiff, or the
defendant?
If the plaintiff is without fault, then as between an innocent
plaintiff and culpable defendant the risk of nonrecovery against a
third person should equitably lie with the culpable defendant. This
is the doctrinal basis for joint and several liability at common law,
when contributory negligence was a total bar to recovery and the
plaintiff could not recover unless entirely free of fault. This doctrinal basis is undermined, however, in comparative fault when a partially at-fault plaintiff can nevertheless recover-unless it is argued
that contributory (i.e., self-directed) fault is less culpable than negligence (i.e., fault directed toward another). It is likewise undermined
in those cases in which a defendant can be held strictly liable without regard to fault.
The Uniform Comparative Fault Act apportions the uncollectible percentage of fault or causation of a third party between or
among the plaintiffs and defendants based on their relative degrees
of fault or causation.2 8 This seems fair. The Act does not abolish
joint and several liability as such, but apparently places the initial
burden on the defendant to show that contribution is not available
before a proportionate reallocation of liability is made.2 9
26. For example, by proposition 51, approved by the California electorate on June 3,
1986 (to be codified as CAL. CIv. CODE § 1431.2 (West)), California has abolished joint
and several liability for noneconomic damages.
27. V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 1-3 (2d. ed. 1986) (by early 1985 comparative negligence had replaced contributory negligence in at least 44 states); see Coney
v.J.L.G. Industries, Inc., 97 Ill. 2d 104, 454 N.E.2d 197 (1983) (listing jurisdictions that
have retained joint and several liability as part of their comparative negligence doctrine).

28.

UNIF. COMPAR. FAULT ACT

§ 2(d), 12 U.L.A. 41 (Supp. 1986).

29. Id. at 41-42 and comment thereto.
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It is doubtful in any event that joint and several liability should
be abolished for cases of defendants acting in concert, or for cases
of principal and agent defendants. Here the maxim of quifacit per
aliumfacitperseseems peculiarly applicable. In these situations, also,
equitable reallocation of an uncollectible portion of liability arguably should not be made between plaintiff and defendant, but instead
the defendant should bear the portion of responsibility of its alter
ego.
III.

CONCLUSION

A number of questions are raised by the current problems associated with the availability and affordability of liability insurance. It
is far from clear that the tort system has caused these problems, or
that proposed changes in that system would remedy the problems.
Even assuming that some changes in tort law would alleviate
insurability problems, however, it does not follow that those
changes should be made. If the tort system in its present form
serves a useful societal function-as it apparently does--of providing individualized justice and a sense of personal vindication and
accountability, 3 0 that system should not be altered in major ways absent substantial proof of its inadequacy. Given present indications,
so well documented by Professor Galanter and others, that proof
has not yet been presented.

30. See W. BECKMAN, G. BELL, B. BORISH, P. CORBOY, D. HASKELL, W. LUNDQUIST, R.
SUHREINRICH, S. SHAPO, TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY: THE CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 12-12; 13-16, 14-12
(1984) (report to the A.B.A.; M. Shapo, Reporter).

